The question of what constitutes a fair distribution of resources is interesting in itself but even more important as it has implications for numerous economically relevant phenomena, such as the design of redistributive tax policies (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Krawczyk, 2010) and bargaining behavior Riedl, 2005, 2006) . In this paper we study fairness preferences in risky environments and ask how people's fairness ideals differentiate between situations involving bad luck that is the result of a choice (bad option luck) and those involving bad luck resulting from randomness that cannot be avoided (bad brute luck).
Option luck is "a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out -whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she […] might have declined" (Dworkin, 2000, p. 73) . Brute luck, on the other hand is "a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles" (ibid). In other words: if a person goes blind as a result of a genetic condition, her brute luck is bad, but if she buys a lottery ticket and wins, her option luck is good (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001 ).
In the laboratory experiment reported in this paper we investigate how a disinterested third party (a spectator) divides resources between two other agents. We specifically consider the case where the resources to be divided are generated through a risky process which the agents can only partly control -i.e. both option and brute luck are present. Based on previous research, we expect (and confirm) that a significant fraction of spectators either equalize all inequalities between the two agents (i.e. they are strict egalitarians) or they equalize no inequalities (i.e. they are libertarians).
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The focus of this paper is, however, on the many people who are interior allocators and sometimes, but not always, choose the equalizing option. In both the normative and the descriptive literature on social preferences a popular candidate for this intermediate norm is one that conditions compensation for a bad outcome on its cause. More specifically, this norm states that a fair distribution of resources should even out inequalities that do not reflect choices that an agent has made, and over which she therefore lacked control.
1 Strict egalitarianism and libertarianism are similar, although not always identical, to the notions of ex-post and exante egalitarianism respectively, see for example Cappelen et al. (2007 Cappelen et al. ( , 2013 . In the particular experimental design described here, the behavioral predictions of strict egalitarianism and ex-post egalitarianism overlap as do the behavioral predictions of libertarianism and ex-ante egalitarianism.
In philosophy this norm is referred to as luck egalitarianism which is the term we will use (canonical texts are Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; and Dworkin, 2000) . This norm has also been studied in economics by for example Konow (1996) who calls it the accountability principle. In his words, "the Accountability Principle […] requires that a person's fair allocation (e.g. of income) vary in proportion to the relevant variables that he can influence (e.g. work effort) but not according to those that he cannot reasonably influence (e.g. a physical handicap)" (Konow, 1996, p. 13) .
Empirical research has indicated that luck egalitarianism provides a good description of people's actual distributive behavior. One example can be found in Konow (2000) . He shows in a laboratory experiment that when the resources that are to be divided are generated randomly, outside the control of the agents, disinterested spectators almost always implement an equal split. However, when the resources come about through efforts of the agents, Konow finds that the spectators' split is proportional to the agents' respective effort levels.
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A key assumption underlying luck egalitarianism is that uncontrollable and controllable factors are treated separately in the sense that agents are not held responsible for behavior that did not cause or influence the outcome. However, this assumption has to our knowledge never been explicitly tested. The reason is that previous studies, including Konow (2000) , have not allowed for situations in which the spectator has been aware of the agents' actions with respect to controllable factors at the same time as it has turned out that it was the uncontrollable factors that caused the outcome.
Our experimental design solves this problem by having both controllable option luck and uncontrollable brute luck present and easily distinguishable. For a luck egalitarian spectator, who conditions compensations for a bad outcome on its cause, a fair distribution only holds agents responsible for outcomes that they could control. In our experiment this would imply that she compensates agents for bad outcomes that are due to bad brute luck but not those that are due to bad option luck. This is, however, not the behavior we find. Instead, a large share of spectators makes bad brute luck compensation conditional on how the agent handles option luck. These spectators only 2 For other experimental investigations of luck egalitarianism and the accountability principle, see e.g. Schokkeart and Devooght (2003) and Becker (2013) .
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compensate an agent who experiences bad brute luck when she also avoided exposure to option luck, even though the outcome would not have been affected if the agent had made a different option luck decision. We label this norm choice compensation.
This behavior is inconsistent with fairness views where the definition of a fair distribution depends on the cause of the outcome, such as luck egalitarianism. Instead, it suggests a fairness view that is agency dependent, i.e. conditional on aspects of the agent's behavior, regardless of whether this behavior mattered for the outcome or not. Taken together, the spectators in our experiment are well described if we assume that there are three types: libertarians, strict egalitarians and choice compensators. We find very limited support for the existence of luck egalitarians.
Our results can be related to those of Cappelen et al. (2013) , who share our interest in fairness views in circumstances involving risk taking. They find support for a fairness norm that holds people responsible for their choices but not for their luck and endorses redistribution between people who make the same decision regarding risk exposure. However, as their design has only controllable option luck present they cannot test, as we do, the extent to which an agent's responsibility for a choice made in a controllable situation carries over into an uncontrollable context in which the choice was irrelevant.
From here, the paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the experimental design. Section II investigates how agents' bad brute luck is compensated (or not) by the spectators in the experiment. Section III provides a model of the distributive choices made in the experiment and presents the result of a maximum likelihood estimation of which fairness norms the spectator behaves in accordance with. Section IV concludes.
I. The experiment

A. Design
Each experimental session was identical and consisted of three parts with all subjects participating in all parts 3 . In the first part all participants were informed that they each had been allocated an endowment of $24. They were told that at the end of part 1, one of three equally probable 3 Participants were told at the beginning of the session that there would be several parts and that instructions would be given for one part at a time, ahead of that part. Instructions can be found in Appendix A.
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events would be drawn: A, B or C. If event A would be drawn for a participant, she would keep her endowment whereas if event B or C were drawn, she would lose her endowment.
Before the events were drawn, all participants were given a choice about whether or not to buy an insurance that would protect against the loss associated with event B. This insurance would not protect the agent against the loss associated with event C. Participants were informed that the price of the insurance would be $12, but that this would only have to be paid if the participant ended up keeping her endowment. This implies that a participant who chose to insure against event B would end up with $12 if event A or B were drawn (she would then keep the endowment of $24 and pay the cost of the insurance) but nothing if event C was drawn. A participant who chose not to insure would get $24 if event A was drawn, and nothing if event B or C were drawn.
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The fact that agents could insure against only one source of loss gives rise to a situation where both uncontrollable and controllable elements are present. As it was impossible to eliminate the risk associated with event C, we have that this event constitutes bad brute luck in our experiment.
On the other hand, the optional insurance against the loss associated with event B guaranteed the presence of option luck.
After the participants had decided whether or not to buy the insurance, they were informed that an event had been drawn for them that would be revealed at the end of the experiment. Thereafter, part 2 of the experiment started in which participants were randomly paired. They were informed that they were to make choices regarding the distribution of income from part 1 for another pair of participants referred to as Person 1 (P1) and Person 2 (P2) and that this choice would have no monetary consequences for themselves. This implies that they would make decisions as a disinterested spectator for another pair. 4 Note that the insurance offered to the participants was actuarially fair as the expected value was USD 8 regardless of whether insurance was bought or not. Participants were explicitly pointed to this fact. The design choice to have a fair insurance was made in order to avoid concerns regarding an efficiency loss related to the insurance. A variation in the cost of insurance would, however, constitute an interesting avenue for future research.
5 Previous research on social and distributive preferences has studied the behavior of both stakeholders (Cappelen et al., 2007; Cherry et al., 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frohlich et al., 2004) and disinterested spectators (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; and Konow, 2000, 2009) .
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The strategy method was used and each spectator saw, and made decisions in, several situations involving P1 and P2. In each situation the spectator was informed about the insurance choices, the events drawn and the earnings for both participants in the pair (we refer to a combination of an event and a choice as an outcome). There were two spectators matched to each pair and participants were informed that one of the two spectators' choices would be randomly chosen and implemented for the pair.
All spectators made distribution decisions in the 11 situations summarized in Table 1 . These situations were chosen as they constitute all possible outcomes from part 1 that resulted in unequal earnings between P1 and P2 (if earnings were equal, the options in the binary choice coincided and the spectator's decision was uninteresting). The table also shows the earnings from part 1 for both people in the pair. In each situation the spectator had to decide whether to leave earnings unchanged, or to equalize them.
The spectators saw, and made decisions in, the situations one at a time in the order outlined in the table. After every third choice they were showed a summary of the three most recent decisions (the summary screen after the last choice only showed the most recent two choices). The Cappelen et al. (2013) find that agents' behavior is fundamentally determined by the same principles regardless of whether they act as stakeholder or spectators but Aguiar et al. (2013) find that this is not the case. In order to investigate whether our results would be different if the spectators had themselves not made the insurance decision, we also conducted a version of our experiment where the roles were separated and participants made decisions in either part 1 or in part 2. The details of this version of the experiment are reported in Appendix B where we show that all conclusions drawn here are valid also in that setting. Appendix B also investigates the relation, in the original experiment, between the spectators' own insurance decision and her choice of whether or not to equalize outcomes for other participants.
6 If a pair ended up in a situation that was not covered by these 11 situations, i.e. a situation where they ended up with the same amount, a twelfth situation was added for the spectators matched to them which displayed what the two participants were actually experiencing. This was done in order to make sure that it was always true that the division was decided by the spectators matched to the pair. Note that it was still not possible for the spectators to know which situation had occurred for their matched pair since the number of situations was not announced in advance.
spectators then had the opportunity to revise their decisions if they so desired or to simply confirm the original decision.
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After participants had made decisions in the 11 situations they were presented with their earnings and thereafter, in the third part of the experiment, they answered a questionnaire.
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B. Implementation
The experiment was conducted at the Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER) at the Harvard Business School in August and September 2012. A total of 152 people, who could only take part once, participated (average age 24 years, 49 percent females). They were rewarded with on average USD 20 (including a fixed show-up fee) for their participation in a session that lasted approximately 40 minutes. 7 We gave participants this option in order to provide an additional opportunity for them to contemplate their choice.
The option was not widely used: only 4.3 percent of decisions were changed on the summary screens. No results reported here are sensitive to using only original choices. For expositional ease thi s ta bl e pres ents the situations such tha t P1 always has higher earnings tha n P2 from part 1. In the experiment thi s ordering was not imposed.
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The experiment was computerized using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
In order to ensure common knowledge, the experimenter read the instructions out loud in addition to them being given on the participants' computer screens. A summary of the instructions was also provided on paper. On two occasions (before the start of each of the two parts) participants had to correctly answer a quiz on the instructions in order to be able to continue. Only very few participants experienced problems with the questions (and all results are robust to excluding these observations), but those who did were provided with repeated instructions by the experimenter.
II. Situations with and without bad brute luck
We start by considering the insurance choice that participants made in the first part of the experiment. We can conclude that there was significant variation in insurance choice as 121 participants chose to insure whereas 31 did not. This, in turn, is important as it validates our interpretation of both option and brute luck being present in the experiment. a significant proportion of the spectators follow a norm where they compensate agents for outcomes that are due to bad brute luck but not for those due to bad option luck, i.e. that many spectators are luck egalitarians. As an illustration, note that if 10 percent of our sample consisted of luck egalitarians, 50 percent of libertarians and 40 percent of strict egalitarians, the pattern from Figure 1 is what we would expect.
We now turn to investigating whether the assumption from luck egalitarianism about spectators treating brute and option luck separately holds. Table 2 displays the data from all choices the spectators made. In order to better understand how the spectators handled situations where one of the agents suffered bad brute luck, we utilize the fact that the six situations involving bad brute luck can be divided into three pairs where the insurance choice of P1 and the outcomes for both P1 and P2 from part 1 are held constant. The only thing that differs between the two situations in each pair is whether P2 bought insurance or not.
Error bars mark standard errors, clustered on participant. N= 1672 (152 spectators). Consider first situations 2 and 5. In situation 2, P1 chose not to insure and in part 1 event A was randomly drawn for her, leaving her with $24. The circumstances for P1 were the same in situation 5. In both situations, the event that was drawn for P2 was C, i.e. the event that it was not possible to insure against, leaving P2 with no earnings from part 1. However, in situation 2, P2
had not insured against the loss associated with event B, whereas in situation 5 she bought this insurance. As is evident from the table, this made a significant difference with regards to whether earnings were equalized or not. Whereas just below half of the spectators (49.3 percent) equalized earnings in situation 2, 73 percent did so in situation 5, a difference that is highly statistically significant (p < 0.01).
We now turn to situations 4 and 6. In these two situations P1 chose to insure, and got a draw of event B, leaving her with $12 from the first part. P2 again got a draw of C, but had chosen to insure against the loss associated with event B in only one of the two situations. Again, spectators were significantly more willing to equalize earnings in the situation where P2 chose to buy the insurance (62.5 percent) compared to the situation where she did not (27.0 percent) (p < 0.01). A similar pattern can be found in situations 8 and 10, with 63.8 percent of spectators equalizing payoffs when P2 had bought the insurance compared to 27.0 percent when she chose not to insure (p < 0.01). IN The participant chos e to buy the insurance against the loss associated wi th event B.
Robus t standard errors in parenthes es. N=152.
From this we can conclude that situations where inequality had arisen because of an event of bad brute luck was treated very differently depending on which choice the agent who was subject to the bad brute luck made regarding exposure to option luck, i.e. if she had bought the insurance protecting her from the loss associated with event B or not. This was so even though this decision was irrelevant for the inequality at hand.
To summarize, we see that the uncontrollable and controllable situations are not treated separately in the way that luck egalitarianism, which conditions compensation for bad outcomes on their cause, assumes. Instead, the reason that earnings in situations involving bad brute luck on average are equalized to a large extent seems to be that many spectators compensate some instances of brute luck, namely those where the agent chose to minimize exposure to the risk associated with option luck. This, in turn, leads us to conclude that it may be more appropriate to describe these spectators as "choice compensators", i.e. they condition compensation for low earnings on the agent's choice to minimize exposure to option luck rather than on which event that actually caused the low earnings.
III. Estimation of fairness ideals
A. Conceptual framework
All distributive decisions in the experiment were made by spectators without any monetary selfinterest in the distribution of pay-offs. We follow Cappelen et al. (2013) and assume a model in which a spectator incurs an internal cost when the amount that she allocates to an agent deviates from , i.e. from what the fair allocation would be according to the spectator's fairness ideal :
;· , ;· .
We assume that the cost of acting unfairly is increasing in the absolute value of the difference between what an agent is allocated and what her fair income would be, and focus on the case where the loss function in equation (1) is quadratic. The (trivial) solution to the spectator's optimization problem is then given by .
Building on previous research, we hypothesize that some spectators behave in accordance with strict egalitarianism (SE) and want to equalize all outcomes, and that some are libertarians (L) who do not want to equalize any outcomes. In the setting of our experiment we then get that the fair allocation to P1 (which implicitly also defines the fair allocation to P2) for these spectators are:
,
where denotes person i's earnings from part 1.
We also expect there to be spectators whose behavior fall in neither of these extreme categories.
One alternative intermediate norm is luck egalitarianism (LE), meaning that the spectator condition compensation to the person with the lowest income on the underlying cause. More precisely, a luck egalitarian spectator compensates when the low income is caused by bad brute luck and then only compensates the part that was due to the bad brute luck, neutralizing the role of option luck.
To define the luck egalitarian position it is essential to discriminate between situations with and without bad brute luck. Let the events drawn for P1 and P2 be denoted , , , and partition into events with bad brute luck, , in which agents get paid nothing and events without bad brute luck, , , in which deviations in earnings from the insurance value (which in our setting, with an actuarially fair insurance, is $12) is always a matter of option luck. A luck egalitarian spectator only wants to compensate an agent who suffered bad brute luck for the part of the inequality that stems directly from this source. Hence is not the case that she necessarily equalizes the full income differences just because an agent suffered bad brute luck. In our experimental setting we get the following fair allocation to P1 under luck egalitari-
13 Finally, given the results presented in Section II another alternative norm is choice compensation (CC), i.e. that the spectator condition compensation to the person with the lowest earnings on her choice regarding exposure to option luck. We denote the insurance choices for P1 and P2
, , and get, in our experimental setting, the following fair allocation to P1
under CC (remembering that P1 always has a higher earning than P2): Table 3 outlines what behavior these four fairness norms predict in the 11 situations in which spectators made decisions in our experiment.
Note that luck egalitarian spectators in situations 2 and 5 are indifferent between equalizing earnings or not. Equation (4) tells us that in these situations a luck egalitarian spectator would prefer to split the total earnings of 24 in such a way that P1 receives 18 and P2 receives 6. The reason is that she only wants to compensate for the part of the inequality that stems directly from the bad brute luck of the person with the lower earnings. However, as this option was not al- 
B. Exact classification of spectators
Considering all 11 choices, the data show that whereas 13.1 and 19.6 percent of spectators made decisions that are exactly in accordance with strict egalitarianism and libertarianism respectively, only one person (0.7 percent) made luck egalitarian choices. 7.8 percent made choice compensating decisions.
These data are outlined in Table 4 where we also show that the conclusion of their being comparatively few luck egalitarians is not sensitive to allowing the spectators to occasionally make small deviations from the respective fairness ideal.
C. Estimation of choice model
In order to conduct a structural estimation of which norms the spectators in our experiment behave in accordance with, we continue to follow Cappelen et al. (2013) and assume a choice random utility model
11 Since luck egalitarians are allowed to make either choice in two situations (a flexibility not granted to strict egalitarians, libertarians or choice compensators), it may seem easier for a participant to be categorized as a luck egalitarian than to be categorized as behaving in accordance with any of the other norms. However, the results reported in Table 4 and 5 are robust to removing this flexibility for luck egalitarianism and instead demanding equalizing choices in situations 2 and 5. where is assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value. The parameter determines a spectator's willingness to trade off deviating from her fairness ideal given random utility shocks to the alternatives available in each situation. In the limit case where 0 choice probabilities are always uniform, whereas as γ ∞ choices converge to always being in line with the prediction of the fairness ideal. We want to estimate the distribution of γ and the population share for each of the fairness views: λ (share of strict egalitarians), λ (libertarians), λ (luck egalitarians) and λ (choice compensators).
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 5 . Specification (1) confirms the conclusion from Table 4 , that only very few of our spectators exhibit a behavior that is in line with the predictions of luck egalitarianism. By comparing specification (1) with specification (2), where luck egalitarianism is excluded, we note that even though luck egalitarianism does contribute marginally to the likelihood, the explanatory power of this norm is small.
As is also evident from specifications (1) and (2), substantial (and about equally large) shares of the spectator can be described as strict egalitarians, libertarians and choice compensators respec- The dis tribution of γi is para metrized such tha t log γ ~ N(μ, σ 2 ). One ideal is es ti ma ted residually, and standard errors (i n pa renthes es ) are ca l cul a ted from the es ti ma ted pa ra meters us ing the Delta method. The es ti ma ti on approach us es BFGS to maximize the likelihood, after an initial search for starting va l ues . Tota l number of decis ions = 1672, tota l number of s pecta tors = 152.
tively. In specifications (3)-(5) we remove, in turn, one of these three fairness norms. This leads to substantially lower likelihood values, which tells us that all three fairness norms are important in order to account for the observed choices. This conclusion is corroborated by how the estimated distribution of changes between specification (1)-(2) on the one hand and (3)-(5) on the other hand. The latter all have extreme values of , indicating numerical problems with fitting the model without one of these ideals as it then needs to predict uniform choice probabilities for a substantial fraction of the participants in order to fit data.
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IV. Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on fairness views in situations where the outcome is determined by luck. We jointly consider two types of luck: brute luck, which the individual cannot influence, and option luck, the exposure to which is in control of the individual. In the experiment we study which fairness norms people adhere to when they act as spectators and distribute resources between two other agents.
There are three main findings. First, we document that the spectators are, on average, more likely to equalize earnings between agents in situations where bad brute luck played a role in generating the initial inequality. This might lead one to believe that a significant fraction of spectators are luck egalitarians who condition compensation for a bad outcome on its cause. However, our second finding is that spectators do not treat brute and option luck separately, as they should if they were behaving in accordance with this norm. Our third finding is that instead many spectators condition compensation for bad brute luck on the agent's choice about option luck exposure.
We call this fairness norm "choice compensation" and use a choice model to estimate which share of spectators adhere to the different fairness ideals. We find that our data is well explained by a model with three types: libertarians, strict egalitarians and choice compensators, who each make up about a third of our sample. We find very little support for the existence of luck egalitarians.
Our investigation is descriptive rather than normative and the finding that spectators are choice compensators rather than luck egalitarians is not an evaluation of the moral standing of these norms. It is simply a description of how the participants in our experiment handle the joint pres-12 Further details about the maximum likelihood estimation, and a measure of model fit, are available in appendix E. ence of uncontrollable and controllable events when making redistributive decisions. Our findings show that it may not be enough to consider the cause behind a particular situation in order to understand how fairness is assessed. Other factors preceding the situation, such as a choice, may be more important even when they do not actually influence the outcome.
How can we understand the notion of choice compensation as compared to luck egalitarianism?
The two norms are similar in the sense that both have responsibility for own choices at the core.
The difference is that whereas luck egalitarians apply this responsibility only in circumstances that an agent can control, the choice compensators extend it to also encompass situations where the choice neither caused nor affected the outcome.
There are several reasons why this behavior could arise. Choice compensating spectators may, for example, want to reward "good behavior" (if they regarded buying the insurance as the correct thing to do). Another possibility is that spectators use the insurance choice as a signal about a person's type (as the insurance decision involves a fair gamble it seems a natural basis for distinguishing for example between risk averse and risk loving people): If spectators care differently about different types (or simply desire to respect preferences), it is then natural that they condition their distribution decision on this signal. However, given that our experiment was not set up to distinguish between these (and other) potential underlying motivations for the existence of choice compensators we leave it for future research to pin down the exact source of this behavior .
Despite the logic behind luck egalitarianism and choice compensation being similar, their implications are potentially very different. According to luck egalitarianism a person with a risky lifestyle is to be held responsible for bad outcomes that are directly linked to her risky actions. For example a smoker is to be held more responsible than a non-smoker for contracting a smokingrelated disease, such as lung cancer, but she is not to be held more responsible if she suffers from an illness that is unrelated to smoking. Similarly, a person who makes risky investment decisions, is frequently seen at casinos, and speeds with his car should, according to luck egalitarianism, not be compensated for losses related to his risky behavior. However, if he experiences bad luck that is unrelated to these behaviors, for example unemployment, he should not be treated differently than a person who has never set his foot in a casino, has his money in the mattress, and drives 10 mph below the speed limit.
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Choice compensators are different. They hold the smoker more responsible than the non-smoker, regardless of whether the disease she contracts is related to smoking or not. Likewise, they regard the notorious risk-taker as less deserving of unemployment compensation than his risk minimizing colleague even if the risk-taking of the former had nothing to do with the risk of unemployment.
These differences between luck egalitarians and choice compensation have policy implications.
If society would endorse choice compensation rather than luck egalitarianism it would imply a step up in the extent to which agents are held responsible for their actions. This, in turn, could be of importance for example for which treatments a publicly financed health insurance should pay for, and the extent to which publically financed treatments should be made conditional on an individual's general risk taking behavior.
Appendix A General instructions
Hi and welcome! You will see instructions on your screen and we will also read the instructions to you, so please follow along.
In this study you can earn money. The amount will depend on your decisions, the decisions of other participants and on luck.
All cell-phones must be turned off. You are not allowed to talk with any of the other participants during the study. If you have questions or need help, please raise your hand and one of us will help you in private.
Also, note that all participants are anonymous and that you will only be identified with the code number that you can find on a small piece of paper on your desk.
The study has several parts. We will now go over the instructions for part 1.
Part 1 instructions
All participants have now been given 24 dollars.
At the end of part 1, one of three events will occur. The events are called A, B and C and they are all equally likely to happen. The consequences of these events are as follows:
-If event A occurs, you will keep your 24 dollars.
-If event B occurs, you will lose your 24 dollars.
-If event C occurs, you will lose your 24 dollars.
Before the random draw between events A, B and C is made, you have the possibility to buy an insurance against the loss associated with event B. The price of the insurance is 12 dollars, but the cost must only be paid if you get to keep your money.
This means that the following will happen if you decide to buy the insurance:
-If event A occurs, you keep your 24 dollars, pay 12 dollars for the insurance and hence keep 12 dollars.
-If event B occurs, you keep your 24 dollars, pay 12 dollars for the insurance and hence keep 12 dollars.
-If event C occurs, you lose your 24 dollars and hence keep nothing.
And the following will happen if you decide to not buy the insurance.
-If event A occurs, you keep your 24 dollars.
-If event B occurs, you lose your 24 dollars and hence keep nothing.
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In sum, the insurance does not affect the expected value of your earnings. If you buy insurance, you have a probability of 2/3 to get 12 dollars and if you don't buy the insurance, you have a probability of 1/3 to get 24 dollars. This means that the expected value is 8 dollars in both cases.
On the next screen we will ask you some questions regarding the choice situation described above. Note that the sheet on your desk sums up all the information needed to answer the questions. 
Part 1 control questions
End of part 1
You have now completed part 1 and one of the events A, B and C has been drawn. You will learn which event that was drawn for you at the end of the study.
We now move on to part 2.
Part 2 Instructions
This part of the study is about the distribution of the earnings from part 1.
Two other participants in this room will be randomly put together to form a pair. Your task is to decide how this pair's total earnings from part 1 will be split between the two of them.
You will see several such situations where you have to make this decision. One of the situations that you will see has in fact happened to the pair. With 50 percent probability your decision in that situation will determine these participants' payoff from part 1 (with 50 percent probability it is determined by another participant, but it is never determined by anyone in the pair).
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In the same way, you have also been placed in a pair with another participant, and someone else in this room will determine how the total earnings in your pair will be split between the two of you.
Please note that you will make the distribution decision for two other people, i.e. NOT for yourself and the one you are paired with. In the same way, someone else will make the distribution decision for you and whoever you are paired with.
Part 2 control questions
We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for part 2 correctly. When you have answered the questions below, please click "I understand". If any of your answers are incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you get to answer that question again.
Question 1: In this part you will be matched to two other participants. Who decides how their earnings from part 1 are split between them? Alternatives: 1) They decide together. 2) One of them decides. 3) I or another participant decides (but none of the people in the pair). 
End of part 2
You have now completed part 2.
Earnings
You can now see your earnings from the study.
Part 3
While we prepare your earnings, please answer the following questions.
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Appendix B
In the experiment described in the main text all participants both made the insurance decisions in part 1 and acted as disinterested spectators in part 2. Participants who chose to insure did make different choices as spectators than those who chose not to insure, with the former being more prone to equalize the payoffs between the two agents in the pair that they were matched to (they decided to equalize choices in 50.6 percent (se=2.92) of the situations on average, compared to 29.5 percent (se=5.37) for those who did not buy the insurance). The difference is highly statistically significant with p<0.01. Table B1 shows the result of the estimation of the choice random utility model, with the sample divided into those who choose to buy insurance and those who choose not to. When we break the estimation down by whether spectators chose to buy insurance for themselves or not, we see that those who chose not to buy insurance are more libertarian. In neither group is there any substantial number of luck egalitarians.
The above analysis tells us that those who themselves chose to insure acted differently as spectators than those who did not insure. This does in itself not say that the spectators in our main experiment would have acted differently if they would not have made the insurance decision themselves, but it bids the question of whether the results would have been different if we had completely separated the roles in the experiment. -162.8 -163.1 -646.8 -647.4 No insurance bought Insurance bought
The distribution of γi is para metrized such tha t log γ ~ N(μ, σ 2 ). One ideal is es ti ma ted residually, and standard errors (i n pa renthes es ) are ca l cul a ted from the es ti ma ted pa ra meters us ing the Delta method. The es ti ma ti on approach us es BFGS to ma ximize the likelihood, after an initial search for starting va l ues . Total number of decis ions in (1) and (2): 341 (31 s pecta tors ). Total number of decis ions in pooled data 1672 (tota l number of s pecta tors 152).
In order to investigate this, we conducted additional experimental sessions in November 2012. In these sessions participants made decisions either in part 1 or part 2, but never in both. Instead of being compensated via the earnings in part 1, the spectators were given a fixed sum of $8 (equal to the expected earnings in part 1) for making the distribution decisions in part 2. It was randomly determined in which part a particular participant would make decisions. We made minimal changes to the instructions to reflect these changes, but in all other respects the design and instructions were identical to the main experiment. All participants (also those who would act as spectators in part 2 and hence would not make the insurance decision) participated in the quiz in part 1 in order to ensure that the spectators had a similar understanding of the situation as they had in the original experiment.
70 people made decisions as spectators in these sessions. Their average age was 22 years and 49 percent were female. Their average earnings were $20 (including a fixed show-up fee).
Just as in the main experiment, we find that the spectators were more prone to equalize earnings between the two participants in the pair that they were matched to when one of the people in the pair had experienced bad brute luck. In these situations payoffs were equalized on average 50.48 percent (se=3.90) of the time. In the situations without bad brute luck the corresponding percentage was 38.29 percent (se=3.54). This difference is statistically significant with p<0.01.
In the main text we utilized the fact that the six situations involving bad brute luck can be divided into three pairs (2 and 5, 4 and 6, and 8 and 10 respectively) where the insurance choice of person 1 and the outcomes for both P1 and P2 from part 1 are held constant. The only thing that differed between the two situations in each pair is whether person 2 bought insurance or not. In the November-sessions, where the spectators had not made the insurance decision themselves, we found the same pattern as in the original experiment, namely that spectators redistributed more when the person who suffered bad brute luck had also chose to insure against bad option luck. In situation 2, 51.43 percent (se=6.02) chose to equalize which is significantly less (p<0.01) than in situation 5 where 72.86 percent (se=5.35) equalized. The difference in situations 4 and 6 (where 61.43 percent, se=5.86 and 24.29 percent, se=5.16 chose to equalize) and in situations 8 and 10 (where 30.0 percent, se=5.52 and 62.86 percent, se=5.82 chose to equalize) were also highly statistically significant (p<0.01).
Lastly, Table B2 shows the result of the estimation of the choice random utility model, both for the sessions in November only, and for the pooled data.
We conclude that the conclusions drawn from the main experiment holds also when the spectators did not themselves make the insurance decision: 1) There are more equalizing decisions when one of the agents in the pair experienced bad brute luck. 2) Brute luck and option luck are not treated separately as is required by luck egalitarianism. 3) There are very few luck egalitarians among our spectators but significant shares of strict egalitarians, libertarians and choice compensators. The distribution of γi is para metrized such tha t log γ ~ N(μ, σ 2 ). One ideal is es ti ma ted residually, and standard errors (i n pa renthes es ) are ca l cul a ted from the es ti ma ted pa ra meters us ing the Delta method. The es ti ma ti on approach us es BFGS to ma ximize the likelihood, after an initial search for starting va l ues . Total number of decis ions in (1) and (2) For the interested reader we provide an overview of the results from the questionnaire here. For more details, please contact the authors.
On the question regarding how concerned the individual was about fairness when making the distribution decision the average answer was 7.66 (N=152, se=0.22). Spectators whose behavior was exactly in accordance with strict egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism and choice compensation respectively had average answer of 7.95 (N=20, se=0.456), 7.83 (N=29, se=0.636), 10 (N=1, se=N/A), 8.58 (N=12, se=0.260).
The average answer regarding personal risk aversion was 5.45 (N=152, se=0.190). For those who decided to buy the insurance in part 1 of the experiment the answer was 5. 01 (N=120, se=0.20) , for those who did not the average answer was 7.13 (N=32, se=0.386). Spectators whose behavior was exactly in accordance with strict egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism and choice compensation respectively had average answer of 5.1 (N=20, se=0.624), 6.17 (N=29, se=0.481), 6 (N=1, se=N/A), 5.167 (N=12, se=0.534).
Our sample consisted of 48.7 percent women (N=74) and 51.3 percent men (N=78). Women choose to equalize the earnings of the participants in the pair in, on average, 49.75 percent (se=3.59) of their distributive decisions. The corresponding percentage for men was 42.77 (se=3.85). The gender split between spectators whose behavior was exactly in accordance with one of the norms considered was 55 percent women (N=11) and 45 percent men (N=9) for strict egalitarianism, 34.5 percent women (N=10) and 65.6 percent men (N=19) for libertarianism, 0 percent women and 100 percent men (N=1) for luck egalitarianism, and , 58.3 percent women (N=7) and 41.7 percent men (N=5) for choice compensation.
Note that this appendix describes the questionnaire data from the original experiment. For corresponding questionnaire data for the November sessions (described in Appendix B), please contact the authors. (2) and (3) are Ordered Probit (OP). Bad brute luck is a dummy equal to 1 if event C happened to any of the two persons in the pair, and 0 otherwise. Gender is a dummy equal to 1 if the decisionmaking spectator is female and zero otherwise. d_12 is dummy equal to 1 if the outcome was 12 to person 1 and 0 to person 2. d_1224 is dummy equal to 1 if the outcome was 24 to person 1 and 12 to person 2. The reference outcome is hence 24 to person 1 and 0 to person 2. Standard errors clustered at spectator level (152 spectators).
In this appendix we present details on the estimated choice model and show how our model predictions compare to the "exact" classifications of Table 4 in the main paper.
As noted in the paper, the assumed utility function is ;· ;· for , /2 .
We assume that the utility loss function, V, is quadratic and equal to ;· , which is the same normalization as in Cappelen et al. (2013) . Choices are made to maximize utility, and are assumed to be extreme value iid, which gives rise to logit choice probabilities. The heterogeneity consists of , in which measures the strength of the fairness motivation compared to the behaviorally stochastic terms , and is the fairness ideal of individual i. For an individual, this gives rise to logit choice probabilities,
where γ · Δ V is the difference in the deterministic utility loss between the actually chosen alternative and that of the non-chosen alternative in situation j. Integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity, we have the likelihood of observing the choices of an individual as L λ Λ γ · Δ V γ; µ, σ dγ , where λ is the population share holding ideal k and γ; µ, σ is the density of γ. We assume that log ~ , .
The (log) likelihood function is maximized with the BFGS method, after an initial Nelder-Mead search for good starting values. We use the stats4 library of R.
Since we are estimating with individual heterogeneity, showing model fit at the individual level is not feasible. Instead we simulate the model with the preferred specification (Column 2 in Table 5 of the paper), and calculate the predicted analog of Table 4 in the paper. In Table E1 we see that the qualitative patterns of Predi cted analog of Tabl e 4 in the pa per. Bas ed on simulations of 10 000 da ta s ets in whi ch (γ i ,k (i )) are allocated according to the dis tribution es ti ma ted in Col umn 2, Tabl e 5 in the paper. Table E1 . Share of spectators by norm in percent, simple classification on predicted data.
